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The search for pain biomarkers in
the human brain
Andre´ Mouraux1 and Gian Domenico Iannetti2,3
Non-invasive functional brain imaging is used more than ever to investigate pain in health and disease, with the prospect of ﬁnding
new means to alleviate pain and improve patient wellbeing. The observation that several brain areas are activated by transient painful
stimuli, and that the magnitude of this activity is often graded with pain intensity, has prompted researchers to extract features of
brain activity that could serve as biomarkers to measure pain objectively. However, most of the brain responses observed when pain is
present can also be observed when pain is absent. For example, similar brain responses can be elicited by salient but non-painful
auditory, tactile and visual stimuli, and such responses can even be recorded in patients with congenital analgesia. Thus, as argued in
this review, there is still disagreement on the degree to which current measures of brain activity exactly relate to pain. Furthermore,
whether more recent analysis techniques can be used to identify distributed patterns of brain activity speciﬁc for pain can be only
warranted using carefully designed control conditions. On a more general level, the clinical utility of current pain biomarkers derived
from human functional neuroimaging appears to be overstated, and evidence for their efﬁcacy in real-life clinical conditions is scarce.
Rather than searching for biomarkers of pain perception, several researchers are developing biomarkers to achieve mechanism-based
stratiﬁcation of pain conditions, predict response to medication and offer personalized treatments. Initial results with promising
clinical perspectives need to be further tested for replicability and generalizability.
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Introduction
Physical pain is intrinsically unpleasant and aversive. This
is the very reason why it is advantageous for survival: it
drives behaviours that avoid bodily injury when interact-
ing with the environment. Yet, especially in modern socie-
ties, acute pain is often devoid of behavioural advantage.
Think, for example, of the pain experienced during med-
ical interventions. Furthermore, an increasing number of
individuals suffer from pain that lasts for months or years
(Breivik et al., 2006). This chronic pain is not only lacking
any obvious behavioural beneﬁt (Hodges and Tucker,
2011), but also heavily impairs quality of life. The fact
that pain has a major negative impact on human well-
being is often used as a persuasive argument to justify
the funding of pain research. The prospect, which has
shaped the way many pain neuroscientists conceive,
design and interpret their work, is that beyond improving
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basic knowledge of the neural mechanisms of sensory per-
ception, research in the ﬁeld of pain will also lead to the
development of more effective means to treat pain and
reduce suffering.
Three arguments are usually set forth to uphold this pro-
spect in the ﬁeld of pain neuroimaging (Kupers and Kehlet,
2006; Borsook et al., 2007, 2010; de Vries et al., 2013; Lee
and Tracey, 2013; Morton et al., 2016; Grosen et al., 2017;
Tracey, 2017). First, it is often claimed that functional neu-
roimaging could be used to derive brain biomarkers that
measure pain ‘objectively’. This would provide a solution
to the hurdle of assessing pain using verbal reports, which
are considered to be inherently prone to response biases
(Wager et al., 2013; Kumbhare et al., 2017). Such bio-
markers for pain would make it possible to quantify pain
severity and the effects of treatments in an objective and
undisputable ‘evidence-based’ fashion. Second, it is postu-
lated that a mechanism-based diagnosis of clinical pain con-
ditions is essential for adequate pain management (Woolf
and Max, 2001; Woolf, 2008; Borsook et al., 2010, 2011;
Lee and Tracey, 2013). By disclosing the neural mechanisms
underlying pain in individual patients, neuroimaging could
thus improve clinical diagnosis and care, for example, by
predicting individual response to treatment (Wartolowska
and Tracey, 2009; Denk et al., 2014; Tetreault et al.,
2016; Davis and Seminowicz, 2017; Kumbhare et al.,
2017). Third, it has been proposed that functional neuro-
imaging and electrophysiology could be used to quickly iden-
tify new pain-relieving drugs by characterizing their effects
on CNS pain ‘circuits’ (Woolf and Max, 2001; Martucci
et al., 2014), an approach sometimes referred to as ‘phar-
maco-fMRI’ or ‘pharmaco-EEG’ (Schweinhardt et al., 2006;
Wise and Tracey, 2006; Woolf, 2008; Gram et al., 2013).
One important question challenges the use of functional
neuroimaging to derive ‘biomarkers’ of pain perception: does
the brain activity sampled by these techniques when an indi-
vidual experiences pain correspond to the neuronal activity
causing the emergence of the painful percept? As summarized
in a review paper that we published a few years ago (Iannetti
and Mouraux, 2010), we and others (Carmon et al., 1976;
Chapman et al., 1981; Melzack, 1999; Downar et al., 2003)
have expressed concern regarding the speciﬁcity for pain of the
brain responses classically observed when experiencing transi-
ent pain, i.e. the so-called ‘pain matrix’, a label covertly imply-
ing some speciﬁcity for pain. The concern is based on the
observation that largely the same functional neuroimaging re-
sponses can be elicited by non-painful stimuli, provided that
they are salient enough (Chapman et al., 1981; Downar et al.,
2003; Mouraux and Iannetti, 2009; Mouraux et al., 2011)
(Fig. 1). More recently it was also shown that a virtually iden-
tical ‘pain matrix’ response can be observed in patients with
congenital insensitivity to pain (Salomons et al., 2016), thus
providing further evidence that these brain responses are lar-
gely non-speciﬁc for pain. (This statement does not imply that
neural activities speciﬁc for pain do not exist. Instead, it implies
that the neural activities captured by current EEG or functional
MRI techniques, which reﬂect synchronous activity within
large populations of neurons, are—at the very least—largely
unspeciﬁc for pain.) To escape from these controversies, many
researchers now refrain from using the term ‘pain matrix’, and
opt instead for terms like ‘pain network’, ‘pain signature’ or
‘neural circuits’ (Tracey and Mantyh, 2007; Seifert and
Maihofner, 2011; Lelic et al., 2012; Longo et al., 2012; De
Simone et al., 2013; Wager et al., 2013). Such labels are
equally suggestive of the idea that the brain responses that
are being measured reﬂect neural activity somehow unique
for pain. To elaborate on only one of these examples, the
term ‘signature’ denotes a distinctive pattern, product or char-
acteristic by which something can be unequivocally identiﬁed.
As detailed below, we argue that the attempts to falsify the
hypothesis that the brain responses being measured are speciﬁc
for pain using appropriate control stimuli have been insufﬁ-
cient, and the liberal use of terms implying speciﬁcity has
biased the interpretation of several pain neuroimaging results.
The danger of assuming that brain responses sampled
when experiencing pain are speciﬁc for pain is well illu-
strated by the way several pain neuroimaging results have
been communicated by the general media. For example, a
press release reporting a neuroimaging study on pain in in-
fants conducted by Goksan et al. (2015) stated that because
the ‘brains of babies light up in a very similar way to adults
when exposed to a painful stimulus, new-borns experience
pain in the same way as adults’ (http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/
2015-04-21-babies-feel-pain-‘-adults’). Evidently, this conclu-
sion, based on reverse inference, is valid if and only if the
observed brain activity is speciﬁc for pain, as detailed in the
‘Pain-speciﬁc and pain-selective brain activity’ section below.
In the following sections, we ﬁrst examine whether an
established assumption—that there is a real clinical need
for an ‘objective’ laboratory measure for the subjective per-
ception of pain—is truly justiﬁed. Second, we examine the
issue of pain speciﬁcity of the brain activity sampled using
functional neuroimaging and electrophysiological tech-
niques. This is necessary and timely, given the increasing
use of new methods to analyse brain activity such as multi-
variate pattern analysis of functional MRI data to reveal
‘pain signatures’ (Wager et al., 2013), as well as the pro-
posal of new theoretical concepts such as the ‘pain connec-
tome’ (Kucyi and Davis, 2015, 2017), in which pain would
emerge from widespread brain network activity. Third, we
assess pragmatically whether current biomarkers derived
from neuroimaging have the ability to measure pain ‘ob-
jectively’. Finally, we evaluate the strength of the evidence
supporting the use of functional neuroimaging to perform
mechanism-based stratiﬁcation of patients with chronic
pain, predict response to treatment, and assist the pharma-
cological development of novel treatments for pain.
Are neuroimaging biomarkers
for pain really useful?
One of the enticing prospects of functional neuroimaging is
that the sampled brain activity can be related to certain
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perceptual states. A spectacular example of what advanced
algorithms to analyse brain activity can achieve is the
decoding of the content of visual perception in wakefulness
and sleep using brain activity sampled in visual areas
(Horikawa et al., 2013). This gives strong theoretical and
technological hope for the ability to use functional neuroi-
maging to decode the occurrence of a wide range of per-
ceptions, including pain.
A crucial point to consider when one aims to use neuroi-
maging to ‘measure’ pain is the fact that, such as any other
percept, pain is an intrinsically subjective experience.
Therefore, even though measures of brain activity can be
objective from a physiological standpoint (e.g. an objective
measure of cerebral blood ﬂow or scalp potential), bio-
markers derived from these measures will be truthful cor-
relates of perceived pain if and only if they account for the
subjectivity of the pain experience (Robinson et al., 2013;
Sullivan et al., 2013).
Healthcare providers often question the clinical utility of
using complex and expensive neuroimaging techniques as
means to measure pain because just interrogating patients
about their pain is much simpler and more straightforward
(Robinson et al., 2013). In the vast majority of circum-
stances, it is hard to argue that they are not right. One
advantage of using a measure of brain activity to assess
pain could be to bypass verbal reports, as these could be
inﬂuenced by factors other than the experienced pain, and
not only in the context of malingering. For example, pa-
tients may consciously or unconsciously exaggerate their
report of pain to attract the attention of the caregiver or
make sure that their complaint is taken into consideration.
Other reasons may lead patients to understate their pain
experience, such as not wanting to seem weak or be a
nuisance, or satisfy the caregiver following a treatment.
Finally, physicians can also be subject to biases, for ex-
ample in relation to culture and ethnicity (Hoffman et al.,
2016). Therefore, contextual factors are not only important
determinants of the subjective pain experience, but might
also modulate how the pain experience is reported and
evaluated, and this is probably why some scientists and
physicians have been seeking more ‘objective’ ways to
measure pain. However, although verbal reports collected
Figure 1 Transient nociceptive stimuli causing pain. In this example heat laser pulses delivered to the right hand (scalp EEG and
intracerebral LFP) or foot (functional MRI) elicit large-scale brain responses. In scalp EEG, the response is dominated by a large negative-positive
wave maximal at the scalp vertex (electrode Cz), probably originating from bilateral operculo-insular regions, the cingulate cortex and, possibly,
the contralateral primary somatosensory cortex. Responses in similar regions are also detected using functional MRI. Importantly, equally salient
but non-painful and non-nociceptive tactile or auditory stimuli elicit very similar EEG and functional MRI responses, indicating that most of this
activity is unspecific for pain or nociception and, instead, multimodal (Mouraux and Iannetti, 2009; Mouraux et al., 2011). Similarly, although the
insula has been proposed to be strongly involved in pain perception, equally salient nociceptive and non-nociceptive stimuli trigger similar local
field potentials (LFPs) recorded directly within the insula (Liberati et al., 2016). Nevertheless, other less prominent features of the sampled activity
might be more selective for pain or nociception, as reflected by the selective increase of gamma-band oscillations (GBOs) when painful heat
stimuli are presented (Liberati et al., 2018). BOLD = blood-oxygen level-dependent; ER% = event-related change in oscillation amplitude;
ERP = event-related potential.
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in large samples and controlled experimental settings may
be more reliable than individual reports in clinical settings,
the only way to test the sensitivity and speciﬁcity of alter-
native measures of pain perception is to compare them to
verbal reports.
In few speciﬁc instances, means to assess the presence or
intensity of pain that do not rely on verbal reports would
be undeniably useful. First, to demonstrate pain in patients
seeking compensation in a medico-legal context (Reardon,
2015; Salmanowitz, 2015; Davis et al., 2017), because the
ﬁnancial incentive for appearing disabled by pain leads
indemnitors to question the sincerity of verbal reports.
Second, to assess pain or nociception in individuals that
are unable to communicate, such as infants (Goksan
et al., 2015; Hartley et al., 2017), adults with consciousness
disorders (Boly et al., 2008), cognitive impairment (Defrin
et al., 2015), and patients under general anaesthesia
(Cowen et al., 2015). However, it should be stressed that
the physiological properties of the brain of such patients
(properties that determine the signal measured using func-
tional neuroimaging and electrophysiology) can be different
from those of the normal adult brain (Iannetti and Wise,
2007; Marshall et al., 2014). Hence, pain biomarkers
derived from healthy adult volunteers are not necessarily
valid to assess pain in these clinical conditions.
Furthermore, the utility of neuroimaging-based pain bio-
markers should be compared with that of biomarkers
using pain-related behaviours or physiological responses
that may be easier to measure and implement in a clinical
setting, such as changes in facial expression, heart rate,
pupil diameter or skin conductance (Cowen et al., 2015)
(Fig. 2).
Pain-specific and pain-
selective brain activity
A great number of studies have shown that noxious experi-
mental stimuli perceived as painful elicit activity within a
wide array of brain regions including the primary (S1) and
secondary (S2) somatosensory cortices, the insula and the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Peyron et al., 2000;
Garcia-Larrea et al., 2003; Apkarian et al., 2005;
Bushnell and Apkarian, 2005; Tracey and Mantyh,
2007). Because these responses (i) are consistently observed
when subjects are experiencing acute pain; and (ii) often
correlate with the amount of pain experienced by the sub-
ject, several studies have claimed that they reﬂect, just to
cite a few examples, ‘the neural substrates of pain’
(Ploghaus et al., 1999), the functioning of ‘cortical areas
devoted to pain elaboration’ (de Tommaso et al., 2005), or
even ‘different aspects of pain elaboration’ (Di Clemente
et al., 2013). As discussed below, these conclusions do
not consider the exclusivity of the relationship between
these responses and the state of experiencing pain
(Poldrack, 2006; Iannetti and Mouraux, 2010).
A ﬁrst question that arises is what is meant by ‘pain-
selective’ and ‘pain-speciﬁc’. When these terms are used
to qualify the functional signiﬁcance of neural activity,
they are often used interchangeably. Looking at how they
are used in other domains is informative, because it indi-
cates that the two terms in fact convey different meanings.
In pharmacology, compound A is qualiﬁed as more select-
ive than compound B, if A has a greater effect than B on
the target population of cells or receptors, and a smaller
effect than B on the non-target populations of cells or re-
ceptors. Similarly, in analytical chemistry, a method is qua-
liﬁed as more selective if it can quantify an analyte with less
interference from other components (Vessman, 1996).
A parallel can also be made between the concept of select-
ivity in pharmacology and the concept of response prefer-
ence in single unit electrophysiology, which indicates
neurons that respond preferentially to a given stimulus, al-
though they also respond to other types of stimuli.
Therefore, a neuron selective for pain would exhibit a re-
sponse preference for pain, i.e. it would ﬁre more strongly
when pain is present as compared to when pain is absent. It
follows that selectivity is not an all-or-nothing property
and, instead, can be graded or quantiﬁed.
In contrast, the term speciﬁcity implies an all-or-nothing
characteristic. In pharmacology, a molecule speciﬁc for a
given target would have an exclusive effect on that target
and no effect at all on any other target. In analytical
chemistry, a speciﬁc assay would be one that quantiﬁes
an analyte without any interference from other components
(Vessman, 1996). It follows that a ‘pain speciﬁc’ neuron
would be a neuron that increases its ﬁring rate when
pain is present, and never does when pain is absent, i.e.
it would exhibit the highest degree of selectivity. Strictly
speaking, demonstrating that a neural response is speciﬁc
for pain is practically impossible: it would require testing
the entire spectrum of stimuli and conditions that could
produce a response, to show that the response is observed
only in the particular cases where pain is experienced.
For this reason, we argue that the terms pain-speciﬁc or
nociceptive-speciﬁc should be avoided not only because it
is practically impossible to demonstrate speciﬁcity, but
also because it is more informative to approach the
problem in probabilistic terms and try to assess the likeli-
hood that a given response is preferential for pain, i.e. its
selectivity. This requires determining the probability of
pain being present when the neural response is observed.
Crucially, this is not the same as determining the prob-
ability of observing the neural response when pain is pre-
sent, as it will also depend on the probability of the
neural response being observed when there is no pain
(Senn, 2013).
A parallel can be made between the deﬁnition of speciﬁ-
city and the validity of conclusions based on reverse infer-
ence of functional neuroimaging data (Poldrack, 2006).
Stating that a given brain response is a speciﬁc ‘signature’
for a given mental state or sensation requires demonstrating
that this brain response is not only always observed when
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Figure 2 Several physiological measures can, in some circumstances, correlate reliably with the reported intensity of perceived
pain. As shown in the left plots, these measures can be obtained at different levels of the neuraxis: peripheral nociceptor activity recorded using
microneurography [firing rate of a peripheral C-fibre nociceptor and intensity of perception as a function of stimulation temperature; adapted from
Torebjork et al. (1984)], spinal cord activity assessed using dorsal horn electrophysiology in animals [firing rate of WDR and nociceptive specific dorsal
horn neuron as a function of stimulation temperature; adapted from Khasabov et al. (2001)] or the recording of nociceptive RIII reflex activity using
EMG in humans [amplitude of the RIII nociceptive withdrawal reflex in the tibialis anterior and intensity of perception as a function of the intensity of
electric stimulation of the sural nerve; adapted from Willer et al. (1984)], cortical activity sampled using non-invasive functional neuroimaging
techniques such as EEG [event-related brain potentials elicited by laser heat stimulation of the hand dorsum as a function of intensity of perception;
adapted from Iannetti et al. (2008)], magnetoencephalography (MEG), functional MRI [fMRI-BOLD response elicited by thermal stimulation at different
target temperatures; adapted from Bornhovd et al. (2002)] or PET, but also autonomic responses such as pupil dilation [magnitude of pupil dilation and
intensity of perception as a function of stimulation intensity; adapted from Chapman et al. (1999)].
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that mental state is present, but also that it is never
observed in any conditions where that mental state is
absent. Because it is not possible to test the inﬁnite
number of conditions where a mental state is absent, one
can judge the likelihood of the statement being true to be
high if the exclusivity of the relationship is demonstrated in
many conditions (Iannetti et al., 2013).
When reﬂecting on the criteria necessary to consider a
neural response as selective or speciﬁc for pain, it is also
important to consider the perceptual qualities that are
coupled with pain, as deﬁned by the International
Association for the Study of Pain (IASP): ‘an unpleasant
sensory and emotional experience associated with actual
or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such
damage’ (Merskey and Bogduk, 1994). Thus, pain is not
deﬁned by a unique attribute, but by the conjunction of
several attributes, such as the intrinsic unpleasantness of
the experience and its threatening association with bodily
damage. In addition, in a large number of circumstances,
pain is also highly salient and, thus, attracts attention.
Because pain signals a threat for the body, it also has
strong behavioural relevance. However, sensations that
are unpleasant, salient and behaviourally-relevant are not
necessarily painful (e.g. the hideous sound produced when
ﬁngernails scrape a blackboard). Therefore, when assessing
the selectivity or speciﬁcity for pain of a given brain re-
sponse, it is crucial to use non-painful control stimuli that
elicit sensations matched with respect to unpleasantness,
salience and relevance. These different aspects are strongly
associated with pain but they do not capture what truly
distinguishes physical pain from other sensations, i.e. the
experience of actual or potential tissue damage (Merskey
and Bogduk, 1994). If the responses to painful stimuli are
not compared to non-painful control stimuli that elicit sen-
sations matched with respect to unpleasantness, salience
and relevance, it follows that it is impossible to determine
whether the differences observed between the brain re-
sponses elicited by painful and non-painful stimuli reﬂect
neural activities that are selective for pain, or neural activ-
ities that are selective for these other features.
Does the brain contain neurons speciﬁc or selective for
pain? At present, there is no clear answer to this question.
Using anterograde trans-synaptic tracing from the spinal
cord via the thalamus to the cerebral cortex in monkeys,
Dum et al. (2009) conﬁrmed the existence of direct di-syn-
aptic spino-thalamo-cortical projections to S1, S2, the
insula and the ACC. However, the projections to S1 were
very sparse (55%) as compared to projections to the pos-
terior insula (40%), S2 (30%) and the mid-region of the
cingulate cortex (24%), which thus appear to constitute the
three main cortical targets of nociceptive input. Single-unit
recordings performed in anaesthetized and/or awake ani-
mals have identiﬁed neurons responding to nociceptive sti-
muli in all these areas (Robinson and Burton, 1980;
Kenshalo and Isensee, 1983; Dong et al., 1989; Sikes and
Vogt, 1992; Yamamura et al., 1996; Treede et al., 1999;
Dum et al., 2009). However, a large proportion of these
neurons show only a moderate selectivity for nociceptive
stimuli, as they respond more strongly to nociceptive sti-
muli as compared to non-nociceptive somatic stimuli, but
nevertheless respond clearly to both types of stimuli. These
neurons are often referred to as ‘wide dynamic range neu-
rons’ (WDR). Other neurons appear to have higher mech-
anical or thermal activation thresholds and, therefore,
appear to exhibit a stronger selectivity for nociception.
These are often labelled as ‘high threshold’ or ‘nociceptive
speciﬁc’ neurons. Supporting the view that S1 is not a
major target of spinothalamic input, neurons responding
to nociceptive input in S1 are strikingly sparse (Kenshalo
and Isensee, 1983; Kenshalo et al., 2000). However, re-
searchers have argued that this could be dependent on (i)
whether the recordings are performed in anaesthetized
versus awake animals; (ii) which subregions of S1 were
sampled; and (iii) the type of nociceptive stimuli that are
used to elicit responses (Mancini et al., 2012; Vierck et al.,
2013; Jin et al., 2018). Considering that tracing studies
indicate S2 and the insula as main targets of spinothalamic
input (Dum et al., 2009), it is surprising that electrophysio-
logical recordings identiﬁed only a very small number of
neurons responding to nociceptive input in these regions.
For example, Robinson and Burton (1980) reported, in
awake monkeys, that most neurons in S2 and the insula
respond to a variety of somatic stimuli, but almost never
respond to noxious stimuli. An explanation for this discrep-
ancy could be a searching bias: noci-responsive neurons
might be conﬁned to speciﬁc subregions of S2 and the
insula, which were not explored by electrophysiological
recordings. Supporting this interpretation, Dong et al.
(1989) identiﬁed a cluster or noci-responsive neurons in
the lateral sulcus on the upper bank of the parietal oper-
culum, at the border between S2 and area 7b. Of 123
neurons responding to somatic stimuli, 118 responded to
innocuous mechanical stimuli and only ﬁve responded ex-
clusively to noxious mechanical stimulation. The authors
were careful in their interpretation, stating that ‘additional
testing is needed to support the tentative conclusion that an
exclusive nociceptive-speciﬁc population exists’ in this
region. In a subsequent study, Dong et al. (1994) attempted
to further characterize the function of these noci-responsive
neurons. In that study, 21 of 244 neurons responding to
somatosensory stimulation responded to noxious heat sti-
muli, but only one neuron responded exclusively to nox-
ious heat and mechanical stimuli. Importantly,
approximately one-third of the neurons responding to nox-
ious heat were at least bimodal: they also responded to
spatially-aligned threatening or novel visual stimuli
moving towards their cutaneous receptive ﬁelds. This ﬁnd-
ing indicates that the selectivity of these neurons does not
relate to nociception but, instead, to threat, saliency, and/or
behavioural relevance (Fig. 3).
As compared to S1 and the operculo-insular cortex, a
greater number of neurons responding to nociceptive sti-
muli have been identiﬁed in the cingulate cortex (Sikes
and Vogt, 1992; Yamamura et al., 1996; Hutchison
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et al., 1999), including a study conducted in humans
(Hutchison et al., 1999). However, a good amount of
these noci-responsive neurons in the cingulate may, in
fact, be supramodal. For example, Sikes and Vogt (1992)
found that out of 542 units recorded in area 24 of the
cingulate cortex of rabbits, 150 units responded to noxious
electrical stimulation of the skin. Of 221 units tested with
noxious mechanical stimuli, only 91 responded, and of 47
units tested for noxious heat stimulation only nine re-
sponded. Approximately 25% of the units that responded
to noxious mechanical stimulation also responded to nox-
ious heat stimulation. These noci-responsive neurons did
Figure 3 Assessing the selectivity for pain of a given brain response requires not only to demonstrate that the response is
present when pain is experienced, but also to demonstrate that it is not present when pain is not experienced. (A) Dong et al.
(1994) recorded the activity of a single neuron located in area 7b, close to the secondary somatosensory cortex. When tested with a variety of
thermal and mechanical somatic stimuli, the neuron responds to noxious heat stimuli applied to the face in a graded fashion, whereas it does not
respond to a variety of mechanical stimuli. Based on these observations one might be tempted to conclude that the neuron is specific for burning
pain. However, the same neuron also responds vigorously to visual stimuli approaching its receptive field (A–E), and the response was most
prominent when the approaching object was novel or threatening. Therefore, in classical pain studies testing the response properties with
noxious and innocuous somatosensory stimuli, this neuron would be labelled as nociceptive-specific (NS). However, this labelling would be
incorrect, at least until the lack of responses to a wide range of equally salient, unpleasant and behaviourally-relevant stimuli has been com-
prehensively demonstrated. (B) Similarly, Hutchison et al. (1999) performed single unit recordings in the human anterior cingulate cortex, and
found many neurons responding to noxious heat stimuli, and not to slow-rising innocuous mechanical stimuli. However, some of these neurons
also responded to watching noxious stimuli being delivered to the experimenter, suggesting that they may serve a supramodal function related or
consequent to stimulus saliency or threat detection. CS = central sulcus; IPS = intraparietal sulcus; LS = lateral sulcus. Adapted with permission
from Fig. 7 in Dong et al. (1994) and Fig. 1 in Hutchison et al. (1999).
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not respond to slow-rising innocuous mechanical stimuli,
such as light stroking, brushing or pressure, an observation
suggesting selectivity or speciﬁcity for nociception.
However, more than half of these units did respond to
fast-rising innocuous mechanical stimuli, such as tapping
of the skin (11/19 tested units), suggesting that these
‘noci-responsive’ neurons in the ACC might in fact be
more sensitive to the suddenness or salience of the stimulus.
Similarly, Hutchison et al. (1999) performed single-unit
recordings of the ACC in 11 human patients. In four pa-
tients, 11 ACC neurons responded to contralateral noxious
thermal and/or noxious mechanical stimuli. None of these
neurons responded to innocuous tactile stimuli. However,
three of these 11 neurons also responded to anticipation or
observation of potentially painful stimuli. Furthermore, the
electrical stimulation of the ACC failed to elicit painful
sensations, even at sites where noci-responsive neurons
had been identiﬁed. Again, this suggests that at least a frac-
tion of neurons responding to nociceptive stimuli may serve
supramodal functions related or consequent to the detec-
tion of stimulus saliency, threat detection and/or behav-
ioural relevance (Hutchison et al., 1999).
Taken together, studies conducted so far suggest that if
truly nociceptive-speciﬁc neurons or even neurons highly
selective for nociception exist in the brain, they are very
scarce (Wall, 1995). Furthermore, because these studies
were almost exclusively conducted in animals that cannot
report whether they are experiencing pain, how the activity
of these neurons relates to the perception of pain is largely
unknown. Finally, as we will argue below, the ability to
perceive and discriminate pain from other somatic sensa-
tions does not necessarily require the activity of individual
neurons with high selectivity for pain, because distinct per-
cepts could emerge from distinct patterns of activity in
neuronal populations having, individually, a low response
selectivity.
Does the brain contain areas that are speciﬁc or selective
for pain? This question asks whether the brain contains
areas in which pain-selective or pain-speciﬁc neurons may
be spatially segregated, in the same way as, for example,
neurons whose primary function is to process visual input
are clustered in the primary visual cortex, or neurons
whose primary function is to generate somatic motor
output are clustered in the primary motor cortex. The
main distinction between this question and the previous
question is that it addresses cortical specialization at popu-
lation level, using techniques sampling the summated activ-
ity of large populations of neurons, such as functional MRI
or EEG. As mentioned above and shown in Fig. 1, using
such brain imaging techniques, there is an important over-
lap between the brain responses to acute pain and the brain
responses that can be elicited by non-painful salient tactile,
auditory or visual stimuli. There are at least two possible
explanations for this overlap. First, it could be consequent
to the difﬁculty in detecting ﬁne-grained spatial differences
in cortical activity using univariate group-level analyses of
spatially-smoothed functional MRI data, or using low
spatial resolution scalp EEG and MEG data. Second, it
could be due to the fact that transient stimuli elicit wide-
spread large amplitude saliency-related responses, which
could conceal smaller amplitude activity speciﬁc for pain.
As detailed above, tracing studies performed in monkeys
have shown that the main projection sites of spinothalamic
input are the insula, S2 and the cingulate cortex (Dum
et al., 2009), suggesting that these areas play a primary
role in the cortical processing of ascending nociceptive
input. Whether these areas are selective for pain is a
timely question, given recent claims that ‘the dorsal poster-
ior insula subserves a fundamental role in human pain’
(Segerdahl et al., 2015), or that the dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex is ‘selectively involved in pain-related processes’
(Lieberman and Eisenberger, 2015).
Segerdahl et al. (2015) used functional MRI based on
arterial spin labelling to identify sustained variations in
brain activity whose time courses follow equally sustained
changes in pain perception generated by the combination of
topical capsaicin and heat. The originality of this tonic
stimulation approach, which has been also used in a
small number of other studies (Schulz et al., 2015), is the
attempt to move away from sampling responses triggered
by the onset of transient noxious stimuli. The authors pos-
tulated that slow variations in brain activity that correlate
with slow variations of pain intensity could isolate brain
activity more directly related to the perception of pain. The
strongest correlation was observed in the dorsal posterior
part of the insula. This led the authors to conclude ‘a spe-
ciﬁc role for the dorsal posterior insula in pain’. The pro-
pensity for sensationalism of the general media led to a
press report stating that the ‘ouch zone of the human
brain had been identiﬁed’ (http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/
2015-03-09-‘ouch-zone’-brain-identiﬁed-0). However, we
and others argued that the experiment did not include ap-
propriate control stimuli to substantiate the claim for ‘spe-
ciﬁcity’, or even ‘selectivity’. Indeed, presence versus
absence of pain was by no means the only difference be-
tween their sustained pain condition and their control sus-
tained touch condition (Davis et al., 2015) (see
http://f1000research.com/articles/4-362 for reviewer and
reader comments). Another crucial difference was that the
nociceptive stimulation was much more salient and un-
pleasant than the tactile stimulation, which in fact failed
to elicit activity in S1. There is now strong experimental
evidence indicating that the differences between the insular
responses elicited by nociceptive and tactile stimulation
observed by Segerdahl et al. (2015) could have been
driven entirely by factors other than pain. For example,
invasive intracerebral EEG recordings from the human
insula showed that transient painful stimuli and non-pain-
ful tactile, auditory and visual stimuli elicit largely similar
responses in all subregions of the human insula including
the dorsal posterior insula, provided that they are similarly
salient (Liberati et al., 2016). Furthermore, there is a case
report of a patient with bilateral extensive damage to the
insula with intact abilities to experience and express pain
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(Salomons et al., 2016). Similarly, although some studies
suggested that lesions of the insula may impair the ability
to perceive pain (Garcia-Larrea et al., 2010), a later review
of 24 patients with acute unilateral stroke lesions primarily
affecting the insular cortex reported no changes in cold
pain, heat pain or mechanical pain thresholds (Baier
et al., 2014). Nevertheless, some studies have suggested
that lesions of the insula impair the ability to perceive
pain and that direct cortical stimulation of the insula or
epileptic activity in the insula can generate pain, although
only in rare cases (Isnard et al., 2011; Mazzola et al.,
2012). Furthermore, intracerebral recordings of local ﬁeld
potentials in the human insula have shown that painful
heat stimuli elicit gamma-band oscillations that are not
observed in response to similarly salient tactile, auditory
or visual stimuli (Liberati et al., 2018) (Fig. 1). Clearly,
in the current state of affairs, whether or not the insula
plays a causal role in the generation of pain remains a
largely open question.
Another study recently claimed that the dorsal anterior
cingulate is ‘selective for pain’ (Lieberman and Eisenberger,
2015). The claim stems from a meta-analysis conducted
using Neurosynth, a tool to analyse a database of published
functional neuroimaging data based on the frequency of
terms used in the manuscripts reporting that data. The au-
thors found (i) that activation of the dorsal anterior cingu-
late is more consistently reported in publications using
pain-related terms (‘pain’, ‘painful’, ‘noxious’) as compared
to publications not using these terms; and (ii) that this is
not the case for studies that frequently used terms related to
executive control (‘executive’, ‘working memory’, ‘effort’,
‘cognitive control’, ‘cognitive’, ‘control’), conﬂict processing
(‘conﬂict’, ‘error’, ‘inhibition’, ‘stop signal’, ‘Stroop’,
‘motor’), or salience (‘salience’, ‘detection’, ‘task relevant’,
‘auditory’, ‘tactile’, ‘visual’). The validity of this compari-
son has been extensively critiqued elsewhere (Wager et al.,
2016; Yarkoni, 2018). Most importantly, using the same
database but manually identifying the topics of the studies
based on the title and abstract, Wager et al. (2016) showed
that activation of the dorsal anterior cingulate was asso-
ciated with a 12% probability of that study involving pain,
on par with language (8%), emotion (12%), attention
(19%) and memory (12%); indicating that the functional
MRI response in the dorsal anterior cingulate is largely
unselective for pain (see also Shackman et al., 2011).
In summary, even though the operculo-insular and cin-
gulate cortex appear to be the main cortical targets of
inputs ascending the spinothalamic tracts (Dum et al.,
2009), the actual involvement of these two brain structures
in generating painful percepts remains to be warranted and
clariﬁed.
Does the brain generate patterns of activity that are spe-
ciﬁc or selective for pain? Faced with the increasing evi-
dence that pain does not appear to emerge from the
activation of ‘pain-speciﬁc’ neurons or brain areas, several
researchers have proposed that the experience of pain could
emerge from the interactions between a population of
interconnected neurons (Norrsell et al., 1999; Melzack,
2005; Kucyi and Davis, 2015). In this view, which is also
increasingly considered in other ﬁelds of neuroscience
(Sporns, 2013), speciﬁcity or selectivity of single neurons
or of single brain areas would not be required to generate
qualitatively unique experiences, like pain. The opposing
‘labelled lines’ and ‘pattern’ theories of neural coding
have nourished scientiﬁc debate for decades (Doetsch,
2000). The pattern coding theory was ﬁrst proposed in
the beginning of the 19th century as a solution to the prob-
lem that photoreceptors only sensitive to three colours of
light can convey information about the entire spectrum of
light colours. This idea was later extended to all sensory,
motor and cognitive brain functions (Erickson, 1963). In
pain research, supporters of the ‘speciﬁcity theory of pain’
have advocated that pain is a speciﬁc modality with its own
receptors and pathways, i.e. pain-speciﬁc labelled lines;
whereas defenders of the ‘pattern theory of pain’ proposed
that pain results from the pattern of activation generated in
receptors and pathways that can also generate non-painful
percepts and, therefore, are unspeciﬁc for pain (Erickson,
1973; Norrsell et al., 1999; Prescott et al., 2014).
This view that pain could emerge from a speciﬁc distrib-
uted pattern of neural activity constitutes one of the ration-
ales for using multivariate approaches to explore functional
neuroimaging data obtained when subjects are experiencing
pain. In contrast to univariate approaches, multivariate pat-
tern analysis (MVPA) attempts to link a particular mental
state, such as experiencing pain, with a speciﬁc spatial pat-
tern of brain activity sampled with functional MRI or EEG
(Schulz et al., 2012; Wager et al., 2013; Corradi-
Dell‘Acqua et al., 2016; Lindquist et al., 2017; Woo
et al., 2017). However, it is crucial to emphasize that test-
ing whether a given spatial pattern of brain activity consti-
tutes a ‘pain signature’ requires exactly the same evidence
that is needed to demonstrate the existence of ‘pain-speciﬁc’
neurons or brain areas. In addition to showing that the
identiﬁed spatial pattern is always present when one experi-
ences pain, one must also show that the spatial pattern of
activity is never present in the absence of pain. Wager et al.
(2013) found that the same spatial pattern of brain activity
can be observed in a variety of conditions where subjects
are experiencing physical pain, and labelled this pattern
‘neurological pain signature’ (Wager et al., 2013). The au-
thors also assessed the selectivity of this response by show-
ing that it is not observed in a number of control
conditions. However, they restricted their testing to control
conditions that differed from the painful conditions in
many ways other than the presence versus absence of
pain. Speciﬁcally, their control conditions were either less
salient, less behaviourally relevant, and/or not somatic; for
example, a low-salience mild warm stimulus versus a high-
salience burning heat stimulus, or a non-somatic ‘social
pain’ stimulus versus a somatic painful stimulus. For this
reason, it could well be that the spatial pattern of brain
activity that they referred to as a ‘neurological pain signa-
ture’ was, in fact, a spatial pattern of brain activity that is
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selective for the occurrence of a salient somatic stimulus,
regardless of whether it elicits pain. Signiﬁcantly, in a later
study, the same authors observed that the neurological pain
signature fails to predict variations in pain induced by cog-
nitive ‘self regulation’, i.e. by imagining that nociceptive
stimuli are more painful or less painful than they are,
thereby demonstrating that the neurological pain signature
does not necessarily track the subjective pain experience
(Woo et al., 2015).
Within the framework that speciﬁc sensations could
emerge from the interactions within a network of intercon-
nected neurons, the interesting notion of a ‘dynamic pain
connectome’ has been recently proposed (Kucyi and Davis,
2015, 2017). In this theoretical model, pain would be
encoded in ‘the spatiotemporal signature of brain network
communication that represents the integration of all cogni-
tive, affective, and sensorimotor aspects of pain’ (Kucyi and
Davis, 2015). At ﬁrst glance, this view is highly similar to
the one proposed by Melzack (1999, 2005) in the ‘neuro-
matrix theory of pain’, in which pain would be ‘a multidi-
mensional experience produced by characteristic
neurosignature patterns of nerve impulses generated by a
widely distributed neural network in the brain’. The differ-
ence between the two theories is that the ‘connectome’ of
Kucyi and Davis (2015) emphasizes that the speciﬁcity of
the patterns is not only deﬁned by which elements are part
of the network, but also by the temporal characteristics of
the activity generated within the different elements. The
fact that there must be speciﬁc features of brain activity
that underlie pain sensations is unquestionable, unless one
takes a dualistic stance on the mind-body relationship.
However, this is not sufﬁcient to demonstrate that there
is a ‘pain connectome’. Future work is needed to translate
this general concept into a set of falsiﬁable hypotheses.
Importantly, one must bear in mind that current functional
neuroimaging techniques may not have the spatial and/or
temporal resolution required to discriminate the potentially
subtle spatio-temporal features of brain activity that under-
lie pain sensations.
What can we conclude from
the ability of neuroimaging
biomarkers to measure pain?
When neuroimaging is used as a clinical tool to predict the
intensity of pain perceived by a human subject, whether the
brain activity used to ‘decode’ pain intensity reﬂects neural
processes that are speciﬁc or selective for pain is not an
issue (Hu and Iannetti, 2016). Indeed, to achieve this
very pragmatic objective, the only requirement is that the
index derived from the measured brain activity must vary
systematically with pain intensity. Furthermore, the rela-
tionship between this index and pain intensity should not
be inﬂuenced by factors not affecting pain perception, at
least in the situations for which the ‘pain biomarker’ is
intended to be used.
Reﬂecting on the use of functional neuroimaging to guess
whether a subject is experiencing pain brings us to the
meaning and deﬁnition of the term ‘speciﬁcity’ in the con-
text of a clinical diagnostic test, which is radically different
from when the term speciﬁcity is used to qualify the func-
tion of neuronal activity (see ‘Pain-speciﬁc and pain-select-
ive brain activity’ section). When referring to a diagnostic
test, speciﬁcity indicates the proportion of patients not af-
fected by a given condition that are correctly identiﬁed as
such (i.e. the rate of ‘true negatives’). Conversely, the term
sensitivity refers to the proportion of patients affected by a
given condition that are correctly identiﬁed as positive (i.e.
the rate of ‘true positives’). Thus, when applied to a neu-
roimaging biomarker for pain, the terms speciﬁcity and
sensitivity refer to the ability of that biomarker to correctly
identify the absence of pain in patients without pain and to
correctly identify the presence of pain in patients with pain,
respectively. Demonstrating that a given pain biomarker
has a high sensitivity and speciﬁcity does not necessarily
imply that the neural activity from which that pain bio-
marker is derived corresponds to the neural activity speciﬁc
for pain, i.e. neural activity causing pain. Thus, if a given
neuroimaging index has a good speciﬁcity with respect to
its ability to measure pain, it is incorrect to automatically
assume that the neural activity from which the index is
derived corresponds to the neural activity generating pain.
In other words, a pain biomarker can have utility (if it has
enough selectivity and sensitivity in a clinical setting, or it is
useful as a dependent measure in an experimental setting),
but this utility does not necessarily mean that the bio-
marker is of any theoretical interest or that we are any
closer to understanding the biological conditions that are
necessary and sufﬁcient for the subjective experience of
pain.
It is instructive to consider the large number of biological
measures that can be used to measure pain, without having
any causal role in generating pain (Fig. 2). For example,
noxious stimuli cause phasic dilation of the pupil
(Chapman et al., 1999; Eisenach et al., 2017). Even
though the magnitude of pupil dilation often correlates
with pain reports (and pupil dilation has indeed been pro-
posed as an objective measure of pain; Cowen et al., 2015),
this would not lead anyone to conclude that pain is caused
by the pupil dilation itself. Another example more directly
related to the brain is the following. If one could properly
sample the activity of all retinal ganglion cells or primary
visual cortex neurons, it would be possible to reconstruct
fairly accurately what an individual is seeing. However, this
does not mean that the sampled activity is what creates the
visual percept. It only means that the sampled activity con-
tains information related to what is being seen. In other
words, one could have an effective pain biomarker using
neural activity that does not actually generate the painful
percept, such as the activity of primary nociceptive affer-
ents or dorsal horn neurons, or the activity of neurons
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related to processes that are consequential to the percept
(Fig. 2).
As a matter of fact, this same issue has led to heated
debates among researchers searching for the neural correl-
ates of consciousness. Identifying these neural correlates
often relies on comparing conditions in which conscious-
ness is present to conditions in which consciousness is
absent (e.g. the presentation of a supraliminal versus sub-
liminal sensory stimulus). As emphasized by Aru et al.
(2012), differences in brain activity observed across the
two conditions do not necessarily highlight the neural ac-
tivity giving rise to conscious percepts, because at least part
of the observed differences could reﬂect a number of pre-
requisites and/or consequences of conscious processing (Aru
et al., 2012).
Another important concept relevant to the discussion
about pain biomarkers is generalizability (Davis et al.,
2017). First, it is important to demonstrate that the bio-
marker generalizes beyond the dataset used to generate the
biomarker. This requires that the dataset used to test the
predictive power of the biomarker is not the same dataset
used to generate the biomarker. Second, a given biomarker
might have high sensitivity and speciﬁcity within the con-
text in which it is developed, tested and used (e.g. presence
versus absence of acute experimental pain) but a low sen-
sitivity and speciﬁcity in other contexts (e.g. presence versus
absence of sustained clinical pain), i.e. it might not gener-
alize to all conditions where physical pain is experienced.
For example, Huang et al. (2013) identiﬁed a biomarker
derived from EEG activity that successfully allows predict-
ing subjective pain reports to brief nociceptive heat stimuli,
both within subjects and across subjects. This biomarker
was based on the amplitude and latency of the negative
and positive vertex waves typically evoked by fast-rising
nociceptive thermal stimuli in the ongoing EEG.
However, an important caveat—which Huang et al.
(2013) clearly acknowledge—is that the relationship be-
tween the biomarker and subjective pain is not obligatory.
We give three examples of a clear disruption of this rela-
tionship. First, simply repeating the fast-rising painful
stimulus three times at a ﬁxed 1-s interval has no effect
on the intensity of the pain elicited by each of the three
stimuli, but has a very strong effect on the magnitude of the
stimulus-evoked brain potentials: compared to the EEG re-
sponse to the ﬁrst stimulus, the EEG responses to the
second and third stimuli are markedly reduced (Iannetti
et al., 2008). In this situation, the biomarker described by
Huang et al. would make the erroneous prediction that the
second and third stimuli elicit less or no pain, thus produ-
cing a false negative. Second, compared to fast-rising noci-
ceptive stimuli, slow-rising nociceptive stimuli can produce
the same intensity of pain, but fail to produce a similarly
large brain response, simply because the magnitude of these
phase-locked EEG responses is strongly dependent on the
phasic nature of the stimulus onset (Iannetti et al., 2004;
Baumgartner et al., 2005). In this case, the biomarker
proposed by Huang et al. (2013) would again underesti-
mate the perceived pain and produce a false negative.
Third, as we detailed above, several studies have shown
that the brain responses elicited when experiencing acute
pain are largely indistinguishable from the brain responses
elicited by non-painful but saliency-matched tactile stimuli
(Fig. 1) (Mouraux and Iannetti, 2009; Liberati et al., 2016).
In this case, the abovementioned pain biomarker would
predict that individuals are experiencing pain when they
are exposed to salient stimuli that are not painful.
Another issue is whether pain biomarkers derived from
brain activity sampled in healthy participants experiencing
acute pain can be used to assess pain in clinical conditions.
Using functional MRI, Baliki et al. (2006) found that re-
gions showing increased cerebral blood ﬂow when human
subjects experience acute pain are very different from the
brain regions whose activity correlates with the spontan-
eous ﬂuctuations of pain in patients with non-acute low
back pain (Fig. 4). From this observation, it follows that
a pain biomarker derived from the brain activity commonly
observed when experiencing acute pain might have a good
sensitivity and speciﬁcity to identify acute pain, but a very
low sensitivity and speciﬁcity to identify the sustained pain
frequently observed in clinical conditions. Obviously, this
issue can be addressed by developing pain biomarkers
derived from brain activity measured in patients experien-
cing clinical pain. In addition to Baliki et al. (2006), several
other promising attempts have already been made in this
direction. For example, Howard et al. (2011) and
Hodkinson et al. (2013) used MRI arterial spin labelling
to compare sustained measures of cerebral blood ﬂow
before versus after surgical tooth extraction, and found
increased activity in the posterior and anterior insula, S2
and the anterior cingulate, i.e. a pattern of brain activity
similar to the pattern of brain activity observed during
acute pain. Using the same imaging technique, Wasan
et al. (2011) compared patients with chronic low back
pain in three conditions: a rest condition, a condition
during which clinical manoeuvres were used to increase
the intensity of back pain, and a third condition during
which noxious heat was applied to the affected dermatome.
They found that increasing the pathological back pain was
associated with increased blood ﬂow in somatosensory,
prefrontal and insular cortices, and the superior parietal
lobule. This pattern of brain activity differed from that
observed during acute noxious heat pain, which showed
no increase of activity in the superior parietal lobule.
However, it also differed from the pattern of brain activity
reported by Baliki et al. (2006). The differences could be
due to the methodologies used to measure brain activity
(blood-oxygen level-dependent signals versus arterial spin
labelling), to create contrasts in clinical pain intensity
(spontaneous ﬂuctuations of clinical pain versus exacerba-
tion of clinical pain using clinical manoeuvres), or to dif-
ferences between the studied populations.
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Neuroimaging for
mechanism-based diagnosis
and stratification of
patients with chronic pain
Researchers have suggested that it might be possible to use
neuroimaging to identify different ‘constituent components’
or ‘networks’ underlying pain and its modulation (Di
Clemente et al., 2013; Denk et al., 2014), such as the
neural activities underlying central sensitization (Lee et al.,
2008), descending pain modulation (Bingel and Tracey,
2008), modulation of pain by emotions, attention or cogni-
tive control (Peyron et al., 2000; Kragel et al., 2018), pain
relief following a speciﬁc treatment (Iannetti et al., 2005) or
placebo analgesia (Bingel et al., 2006; Schafer et al., 2018).
Thus, by identifying in individual patients suffering from
chronic pain the engagement of different ‘constituent com-
ponents’ contributing to the pain experience and its modu-
lation, neuroimaging could make it possible to stratify
patients in functionally distinct groups, with the exciting
prospect of identifying which treatment is most likely to
provide relief in individual patients and, hence, propose op-
timal ﬁrst-line treatments (Fig. 5).
The idea that different measures of pain-related brain
activity can be separated in functionally distinct compo-
nents was probably ﬁrst put forward by Albe-Fessard
et al. (1985), when they proposed that pain processing
can be separated into anatomically and functionally distinct
‘lateral’ and ‘medial’ pain systems, on the basis that ascend-
ing nociceptive inputs project onto lateral and medial thal-
amic nuclei, each having distinct cortical projections
(Albe-Fessard et al., 1985; Ingvar, 1999). In this model,
the lateral pain system, comprising S1 and S2, would sub-
serve the sensori-discriminative dimension of pain; whereas
the medial pain system, comprising various brain structures
including the cingulate cortex, would subserve the affective
and cognitive dimensions of pain. However, although most
researchers agree that this functional dichotomy between
lateral and medial systems is an oversimpliﬁcation
(Brooks and Tracey, 2005; Iannetti and Mouraux, 2010),
it is still used today as a framework to interpret experimen-
tal or clinical observations. For example, the ﬁnding that
pain-evoked brain responses thought to originate from S2
Figure 4 Brain activity related to the perception of acute experimental pain and sustained clinical pain. Top row shows the results
of a meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging publications that frequently use the term ‘pain’ in the full text (Neurosynth-generated ‘reverse
inference map’ using the term ‘pain’). The mask highlights the brain regions that are frequently often observed in ‘pain’ studies as compared to
studies that do not frequently mention the term ‘pain’. The second row shows the overlap between this Neurosynth mask and the brain areas
showing a significant BOLD response when transient painful stimuli are delivered to the right foot of healthy volunteers [data from Mouraux et al.
(2011)]. Note the strong overlap, in yellow. The third row shows the BOLD response elicited by a transient painful stimulus in a group of patients
with low back pain, generally similar to the BOLD response observed in healthy participants [data from Baliki et al. (2006)]. The bottom row
shows, in the same patients, the regions where the BOLD signal correlates significantly with spontaneous fluctuations of low back pain. Note the
lack of overlap between these areas and the Neurosynth-generated mask, indicating that a brain biomarker derived from brain activity triggered by
acute painful stimuli is likely to be unable to assess pain in clinical conditions. LBP = low back pain.
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are modulated by topiramate, a drug used as a pre-emptive
treatment for migraine, led authors to conclude that the
drug acts ‘speciﬁcally on the sensory-discriminative compo-
nent of pain elaboration’ (Di Clemente et al., 2013).
Similarly, numerous studies on empathy and social exclu-
sion have dichotomized pain-related brain activity as
belonging either to ‘the affective part’ or the ‘sensori-
discriminative part’, depending on whether they originate
from brain structures belonging to the medial or lateral
pain systems (Kross et al., 2011, Novembre et al., 2015).
It should be noted that the empirical evidence supporting
the functional distinction between ‘medial’ and ‘lateral’
pain systems is, to say the least, scarce. First, it relies on
two experiments conducted by the same group, showing
Figure 5 Use of functional neuroimaging to predict treatment response and stratify patients. Non-personalized treatment (top).
When a population of patients is exposed to treatment X, some individuals respond to the treatment (e.g. 40%) and others do not (e.g. 60%).
Brain biomarker of treatment response (middle). Functional brain imaging before any treatment is delivered to a group of patients to obtain
predictive information about whether the patients are responders or non-responders. Personalized treatment using brain biomarker (bottom).
The features of brain activity that distinguished responders from non-responders can be looked for in a new population of patients who have not
yet been treated, to predict individual patient’s response, and thereby provide the first-line treatment that is most likely to be effective for that
individual patient.
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that the hypnotic modulation of pain unpleasantness is par-
alleled by a modulation of pain-evoked activity in the ACC,
interpreted as a modulation of the ‘medial’ pain system
(Rainville et al., 1997), whereas hypnotic modulation of
pain intensity is paralleled by a modulation of pain-
evoked activity in S1, interpreted as a modulation of the
‘lateral’ pain system (Hofbauer et al., 2001). Second, it
relies on evidence from the single report of a patient with
reduced ability to detect and discriminate pain, but pre-
served ability to experience its unpleasantness following a
post-central lesion (Ploner et al., 1999), and qualitative re-
ports that chronic pain patients treated with anterior cin-
gulotomy continue to feel pain, but are less emotionally
affected by it (Foltz and White, 1962, 1968).
More recently, rather than focusing on the brain activity
related to the perception of pain, a number of functional
neuroimaging studies have investigated the brain activity
thought to be involved in mechanisms modulating pain,
such as the top-down inﬂuence of nociceptive transmission
at the level of the spinal cord (Bingel et al., 2006;
Tinnermann et al., 2017), the changes in brain activity
thought to be involved in central sensitization or placebo
analgesia (Petrovic et al., 2002; Wager et al., 2004, 2007;
Zambreanu et al., 2005; Zubieta et al., 2005; Lee et al.,
2008), the modulation of pain by cognitive control, emo-
tions and attention (Brascher et al., 2016). If successful,
these approaches hold strong promise. Indeed, considering
that pain-modulatory mechanisms might vary across indi-
viduals, being able to characterize their contribution at an
individual level opens the prospect of being able stratify
patients into functionally meaningful categories, to better
understand the functional mechanisms contributing to the
development and maintenance of chronic pain, and to po-
tentially orient towards more personalized and effective
treatment strategies taking into consideration individual
‘pain endophenotypes’ (Tracey, 2011). For example, func-
tional neuroimaging could be used to assess the ability of
an individual patient to engage descending inhibitory con-
trol mechanisms, or his susceptibility to sensitize when
exposed to intense nociceptive stimulation. Such results
would have immediate practical implications, as they
might allow prediction of whether that patient will respond
well to a speciﬁc treatment, or how likely it is that he will
develop chronic pain after surgery. However, as recently
emphasized by Denk et al. (2014), data currently support-
ing this view are still sparse and, most critically, do not
allow one to infer causal relationships. Indeed, the use of
proper controls is necessary to relate changes in brain ac-
tivity to speciﬁc pain modulatory mechanisms. If brain
structure A has a level of activity that relates positively to
the amount of reduction in pain perception caused by a
given treatment or experimental manipulation, this does
not automatically mean that brain structure A is involved
in generating the pain relief caused by the treatment. For
example, if distraction from the painful stimulus is induced
by performing a counting Stroop task (as in Bantick et al.,
2002), the increased neural activity observed in brain struc-
ture A during distraction could reﬂect brain processes
engaged by the execution of the task, but independent of
the processes responsible for the effect of the task on pain
perception. Hence, observing that distraction from pain is
associated with increased activity in brain structure A does
not allow conclusion that this activity is ‘orchestrating the
modulation of pain by attention’ (Bantick et al., 2002).
Finally, to be clinically useful, such neuroimaging measures
must have predictive value at individual level. In this re-
spect, the use of longitudinal designs is imperative to deter-
mine whether brain imaging can be useful to assess
individual vulnerability to develop chronic pain. Although
difﬁcult to implement, a few studies have followed this line
and generated encouraging results. For example, Baliki
et al. (2012) recently showed that the state of cortico-stri-
atal ‘reward-motivation circuits’ measured using functional
MRI can predict the transition to chronic pain in patients
with subacute low-back pain.
Along the same lines, a recent study from the same group
compared the effects of placebo and duloxetine in patients
with chronic pain, yielding striking results. Speciﬁc patterns
of brain connectivity before receiving the treatment could
predict which patients would be placebo responders, as
well as the degree of analgesia that would be induced by
both the placebo and the active agent (Tetreault et al.,
2016). Given their wide clinical implications in terms of
patient stratiﬁcation and drug development, these results
demand replication. Still, they already hint towards the
practical use of neuroimaging to predict response to treat-
ment in chronic pain conditions.
In conclusion, it is important that further studies on brain
biomarkers of pain and its modulation are conducted to
test the biomarkers’ generalizability, assess their perform-
ance at an individual level, and understand the reasons why
they may correlate with pain or its modulation using lon-
gitudinal design studies and carefully designed control con-
ditions. In any case, it is imperative to draw a clear line to
distinguish between the clinical or experimental utility of a
biomarker and its usefulness in achieving mechanistic in-
sight. A biomarker can demonstrate good utility because it
is able to identify clinically meaningful groups of patients
with a high sensitivity and speciﬁcity (e.g. patients who will
respond in a certain way to a speciﬁc treatment). However,
this does not necessarily imply that the biomarker reﬂects
directly the mechanisms that give rise to a given clinical
pain condition, as the patterns of neural activation that
allow discrimination between conditions might be entirely
epiphenomenal.
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